Recent Responses

Submitted by Damon Blanchette on 9/5/16

This is a second response. I bet this sends another email. And making an attempt to edit this one and see what happens.

Submitted by Damon Blanchette on 9/5/16

This is a test response to my talkin question. Thank you Taxi Driver.

And now I'm editing the response to see if the poster gets another email.

Submitted by Nickolas Pappas on 1/14/16

There are two kinds of responses people make to this question, because Socrates affected later philosophy in at least two ways. First of all, he must have been an extraordinary person, both charismatic and counter-cultural. He seemed to embody the values he inquired into. As a result he could ask probing questions about what a friend is without failing to be a friend. He could ask whether anyone understood courage, but ask as a courageous person rather than as a coward looking to undermine the virtue.

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Submitted by Yuval Avnur on 1/14/16

I'm not sure what arguments you have in mind for these two views, but I understand, I think, the main feature that raises your question: each implies that the other is false. And yet, as you say, you find that each is equally likely. If each implies that the other is false, then they can't both be true, to answer your last question. One of them, at least, must be false. Perhaps they are both false, if they both rest on a false presupposition, for example....Read more

Submitted by Michael Cholbi on 1/14/16

'Impartiality' is in no way a simple moral concept. Yet one thing most moral philosophers would agree upon is that impartiality cannot be plausibly equated with treating everyone the same. Rather, impartiality seems to have both an exclusionary and and an inclusionary aspect. Here's what I have in mind. Being impartial means not allowing a certain fact or consideration about people to influence a choice or a polic...Read more

Submitted by Yuval Avnur on 1/14/16

Interesting question. Here is just a start of an answer. There are at least two ways in which remembering the dead, and the way they died (as with war memorials, which you mention) might be beneficial for non-selfish reasons, though part of this depends on what counts as "selfish." First, many philosophers think that it is possible to be harmed, and benefited, even once you no longer exist. Imagine that a loving father, who upheld his fatherly duties throughout his life even at great cost, is slandered after he dies....Read more

Submitted by Michael Cholbi on 1/8/16

I'm not entirely sure I accept the assumption of your question: Is it really any more difficult to imagine life after death than life before death? Many philosophers have argued that it is difficult to imagine being dead because the act of imagination requires that one be alive. In other words, any attempt to imagine being dead is thereby a failure, some have argued. In imagining oneself dead, one must presuppose that there is a consciousness (a living one, presumably), so one cannot coherently imagine being dead — at least if that means imagining oneself being dead....Read more

Submitted by Stephen Maitzen on 1/7/16

Why is this question so compelling? (to someone, anyway)

Charles Taliaferro posted a thoughtful answer/challenge to the same question just three weeks ago:

http://askphilosophers.org/question/24944

Submitted by Michael Lacewing on 1/5/16

This is a very similar question to another I answered a few months ago, so apologies if you've read that and are looking for a different reply!

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Submitted by Michael Cholbi on 1/2/16

I'd be surprised if there were sound arguments for the immortality of homosexuality, but I agree with your suggestion that whether or not LGBT persons are 'born that way' or not cannot provide a sound basis for the immortality of homosexuality -- nor can it provide a sound basis for its moral permissibility of homosexuality either!

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