I'm not sure why you regard it as a worrisome sign about current philosophy of mind that some of its practitioners take eliminative materialism (EM) seriously. At worst, it would show that some philosophers regard EM as far more plausible than it really is, but even then I don't see how that would indict current philosophy of mind as a whole.
Anyway, you've asked an empirical question whose answer depends on (1) reliable data about the views of philosophers and (2) what you mean by "take seriously." I presume you mean something like "regard as too plausible to be dismissed without argument," which is a weaker attitude than "regard as plausible." I don't have empirical data, but my hunch is that most philosophers do take EM seriously in that sense, but probably because most philosophers don't regard any philosophical position as worthy of being dismissed literally without argument. At the same time, however, my hunch is that most philosophers regard EM as implausible.
Curiously, the PhilPapers Survey doesn't ask about attitudes toward EM, although it does ask about attitudes toward other positions in philosophy of mind. One might conclude that the survey organizers didn't regard EM as worth asking about, which might reflect the organizers' own hunch about the popularity of EM, but they do ask about several philosophical positions that garner the support of only a tiny minority (3% or so) of those surveyed. So I don't know what to conclude about the omission of EM from the list.
But far more important than the actual distribution of views about EM are the arguments for and against it. About those, see this SEP entry.