One thing to ask is what is being referred to by the expressions "Jones in London at noon" and "Jones in Paris at 6pm." Whatever, if anything, is referred to (denoted by) those expressions would seem to be strange: a "time slice" of Jones or a "space-time slice" of Jones. Now, some philosophers do say that such things exist, which are usually called "temporal parts" of Jones. Other philosophers say that there's no good reason to believe in the existence of temporal parts.
Defenders of temporal parts would agree that the two temporal parts referred to aren't identical. But, they say, those two temporal parts can belong to a single individual, Jones, provided that the temporal parts are related (perhaps causally related) to each other in the right way.
On the other hand, opponents of temporal parts can say that a single individual, Jones, has both the property of being in London at noon and the property of being in Paris at 6pm. Jones doesn't have those properties literally at the same time but instead timelessly or atemporally.
Neither defenders nor opponents of temporal parts would be forced to say that Jones is distinct from himself or herself.