Would we be correct to say that, in a sense, Wittgenstein(2) eliminated the need
The sort of remark made in the second paragraph is one I see and hear a lot. But, frankly, I just don't get it. In particular, why is it supposed to follow that I can't use language to speak of a reality that is independent of language? I can use language to speak of all kinds of things that seem to have nothing very much to do with language: Flowers, rocks, supernovas, non-recursive sets, and so on and so forth. Obviously, everything that can be said has to be said inlanguage. But that is so mind-numbingly obvious that I can't see howanything of consequence could follow from it: It's "analytic" in pretty much the "bachelors are unmarried men" sense. And even if one assumes, more strongly, that anything that could be thought at all could be said, nothing in this vicinity follows.