The sort of remark made in the second paragraph is one I see and hear a lot. But, frankly, I just don't get it. In particular, why is it supposed to follow that I can't use language to speak of a reality that is independent of language? I can use language to speak of all kinds of things that seem to have nothing very much to do with language: Flowers, rocks, supernovas, non-recursive sets, and so on and so forth. Obviously, everything that can be said has to be said inlanguage. But that is so mind-numbingly obvious that I can't see howanything of consequence could follow from it: It's "analytic" in pretty much the "bachelors are unmarried men" sense. And even if one assumes, more strongly, that anything that could be thought at all could be said, nothing in this vicinity follows.
In recent years, there has been an upsurge in interest among Anglo-American philosophers in such philosophers such as Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Paul Sartre. In a recent book, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Richard Moran draws on Sartre's Being and Nothingness in order to give an account of first-person authority. I think that there is much in Being and Nothingness that could illuminate such questions as the nature of human freedom and the nature of our knowledge of other minds. Sartre's writings deserve further consideration from Anglo-American philosophers.
I would first encourage you to see what is common to what the two philosophers say. Each one thinks that eudaimonia (happiness or flourishing) is what makes a human life good, and each one thinks that the best way to win that goal is to be virtuous. Each also thinks that being virtuous requires acting in accordance with reason. But there are differences, and there is nothing wrong in responding to these with a preference for one account in favor of the other!